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Abstract
This paper analyzes the persistence of the shock caused by the American
Civil War on the relative city size distribution of the United States. Our ndings
suggest that the e¤ects of this shock were permanent, which sharply contrasts
with previous results regarding World War II for Japanese and German cities. It
should be taken into account that the conict considered in this paper took place
at an earlier stage of the industrialization and urbanization processes. Moreover,
our results are determined by the fact that the battles were fought in the open
eld, not in urban areas. Some related evidence regarding the presence of a safe
harbour e¤ectis reported.
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1 Introduction
One recent research strand in economic geography focuses on the determination of the
e¤ects of temporal shocks on the relative size of cities and its resulting distribution,
considering that the latter has a high degree of persistence. Reinforcing this idea,
previous studies have found that strong demographic shocks caused by wars only had
temporary e¤ects and, hence, previous growth rates are recovered in a few years.
This is the case of Davis and Weinstein (2002) who, after proposing an empirical
framework, analyzed the e¤ects of the Allied strategic bombing on Japanese cities during
World War II (WWII). Also in the context of this conict, and using a very similar
approach, Brakman et al. (2004) studied the consequences of the substantial destruction
of German cities. Furthermore, it should be noted that these latter authors found some
weak evidence of a persistent e¤ect for East German cities.
The studies described above are the only ones that have seriously analyzed the
e¤ects of wars on urban structures. Nevertheless, it can be stated that Nitsch (2003) has
tangentially tackled this issue by analyzing the impact of historical events on city growth
by considering the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a natural experiment of
a dramatic reduction in country size. His ndings lead us to conclude that this process
did not have a sizeable e¤ect on the subsequent population growth of the largest city
(Vienna). In addition, Brakman et al. (2007) established the existence of multiple
equilibria in the city growth of German cities after the WWII bombings. Another
related analysis is that carried out by Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) about the impact of
terrorism on U.S. cities.
This paper forms part of the literature disentangling the impact of temporary shocks
caused by wars on the urban structure of a country by analyzing the case of the Amer-
ican Civil War (ACW). Our contribution is fourfold. First, it sheds further light on an
issue about which there are few serious studies. Second, it explores a di¤erent conict
to that already analyzed. Third, empirical studies related to civil wars have focused on
those that took place after WWII (see the exhaustive survey by Blattman and Miguel,
2009). Finally, this paper deals with the ACW applying the econometric rigour it
deserves.
Before summarizing the main ndings, it should be emphasized that the ACW has
distinctive features with respect to WWII. Basically, it took place at an earlier stage
of the industrialization and urbanization processes and the battles were fought on the
2
open eld, not in urban areas. Furthermore, it is observed that only one of the cities
in our sample decreased its population in absolute terms during the 1860s. For this
reason, it cannot be stated that the shock caused by the ACW on absolute city size
was negative.
Contrary to the results reported by Davis and Weinstein (2002) and Brakman et
al. (2004) for WWII, we nd that the ACW shock had a permanent e¤ect on relative
city size. That is, those cities that grew faster in the 1860s tend to experience a higher
relative size growth rate in the following decade. This result should be interpreted
taking into account that the population of the United States (U.S.) grew at a slower
rate in the period 1860-1870 than in the adjacent decades. Moreover, it is observed
that the cities close to combat zones grew at faster rates during the 1860s with respect
to the previous and the following decades. Therefore, an explanation for the persistent
nature of the shock may be the rural character of the ACW and the safe harbour e¤ect
(Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002) derived from it.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief historical
account of the causes and the main events that took place during the ACW. In addition,
relevant gures about the scope of the conict are reported. Section 3 describes the
empirical model used to estimate the persistence of relative city size shocks, the data
sources and the variables that have been used in the analysis as well as the estimation
technique. The main results and their discussion are included in Section 4. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
2 The American Civil War (1861-1865)
U.S. political debate in the 1850s was centered on the slave system that existed in
Southern states. In 1858, Abraham Lincoln expressed his desire to abolish slavery and
his election as President on 6 November 1860 triggered the ACW, also known as the
War of Secession. The historical legacy of this conict was very important because it
led to the abolishment of slavery, the reinstatement of the Union and the strengthening
of the role of federal government. As a consequence, and together with the subsequent
reconstrution, the country became a superpower.
The war began when eleven Southern slave states that wanted to maintain the racial
hierarchy of their societies1 declared their independence and formed the Confederate
1South Carolina was the rst state to secede (20 December 1860), followed by Mississipi (9 January
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States of America (CSA), whose (only) President was Je¤erson Davis. The support
for secession in any given state increased with the number of plantations it contained.
Those with an intermediate number (Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas and Tennessee)
joined the Confederacy after the battle of Fort Sumter2. The Union was made up of the
states where slavery had been abolished and the ve border slave states with the lowest
number of plantations (See Figure 1). It should be noted that the Confederates had an
economy based on the exportation of agricultural products (mainly cotton, sugar and
tobacco), while the economy of the Union states was more industrialized and urban.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
The events that led to the end of the war began in 1864 when Ulysses S. Grant was
appointed as commander of the Union armies. To gether with Lincoln and William
T. Sherman, he introduced the concept of total warwhich was focused on the defeat
of both the forces of the CSA and its economy. Instead of seeking civilian casualities,
they were more interested in deteriorating the morale of the Confederates through
the destruction of homes, farms and railroads. Many of battles were fought during
Grants Overland Campaign, in which the Union troops su¤ered many casualties.
Nevertheless, it led to the capture of Atlanta in September, which was a decisive event
for the re-election of Lincoln (November 1864).
The Union forces had a decisive victory at the Battle of Five Forks (April 1865,
Virginia), forcing the Conderates to evacuate Petersburg and Richmond (capital of the
CSA). This defeat, together with that at Saylers Creek (April 1865, Virginia), made
their commander, Lee, realize that it was not possible to ght further against the Union.
He surrendered in Virginia on 9 April 1865, at the court of Appomattox. On the 14th
of April, Lincoln was murdered and Andrew Johnson became the new President of the
U.S.
Although the battle of Manassas/Bull Run (July 1861,Virginia) is known as the
rst large engagement, it was not very important in terms of causalities: 2,708 Union
and 1,981 Confederate soldiers. On the contrary, many minor battles were famous
1861), Florida (9 January 1861), Alabama (11 January 1861), Georgia (19 January 1861), Louisiana
(26 January 1861) Texas (1 February 1861), Virginia (17 April 1861), Arkansas (6 May 1861), North
Carolina (20 May 1861) and Tennessee (8 June 1861).
2It took place in 12-13 April 1861 when the Confederates bombed this fortication located in South
Carolina.
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for their severity. For example, General Hood lost 6,000 of his 21,000 men in about
two hours and six Confederate generals died at Franklin (November 1864, Tennessee).
Moreover, many regiments lost more than 80 per cent of their members in a single day.
For example, the 26th North Carolina lost 714 of its 800 men at Gettysburg (July 1863,
Pennsylvania).
[Insert Table 1 here]
The ACW is the conict that has claimed the greatest number of American lifes in
U.S. history. Of the 4 million that fought, 620,000 died (see Table 1), about 2 percent
of the total population. The enormous sacrice of this war in terms of population3 is
evident if the relative number of dead is compared to the Americans that lost their lifes
during WWII (407,316 out of 133,400,000 inhabitants: 0.31 % of the population) or in
Vietnam (around 55,000 out of a population of 208,600,000: 0.03 %).
All these gures lead us to conclude that the ACW was an important demographic
shock that inevitably a¤ected U.S. relative city size distribution. This paper is intended
to determine whether the e¤ects of this shock were transitory or permanent. The
empirical model, data sources, variables analyzed and estimation method used to answer
this question are presented in the following section.
3 Testing for the persistent nature of the shock
The persistence of the temporal demographic shocks caused by wars on the urban
structure of a given country can be analyzed using the data of city population in absolute
terms. However, it seems more appropriate to work with the share of the city population
relative to that of the country. As suggested by Gabaix and Ioannides (2004), this type
of normalization is suitable when analyzing long-run issues because it is necessary to
work with steady-state distributions. Moreover, working with relative city size allows
us to reect more factors than when using absolute rates. On the one hand, a city
can grow in absolute terms but not in relative terms whenever it experiences a lower
growth rate than the other cities. On the other, a city can have a positive relative
growth rate but a negative absolute one. In the latter case, the decrease would be lower
3From the nancial point of view, the war cost the Confederates 4,000 million dollars and four times
this amount for the Union. More than half of this quantity for the Union were pensions to veterans
and their families.
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than that experienced by the other cities. These are the kind of e¤ects we are interested
in disentangling.
3.1 The empirical model
Let Si;t be city is share of total population (relative city size) at time t, and si;t its
natural logarithm. Considering that the initial size of each city 
i is a¤ected by city-
specic shocks "i;t; the logarithm of the relative size of a city at a given point in time
can be expressed as:
si;t = 
i + "i;t (1)
The persistence of these shocks is modeled as an autoregressive process:
"i;t+1 = "i;t + i;t+1 (2)
where  2 [0; 1] is the persistence parameter. The innovation i;t is assumed to be
an independently and identically distributed error term.
The persistence parameter in equation (2) reects how much of a temporary shock
is dissipated in one period. If  = 1, then all shocks are permanent and relative city
size follows a random walk. If  2 [0; 1), then city share is stationary and shocks
dissipate over time. Therefore, the temporary and permanent hypotheses can be tested
by estimating 4.
To examine the evolution of city relative size, equation (1) is rst-di¤erenced
si;t+1   si;t = "i;t+1   "i;t (3)
Substituting equation (2) into (3), it is obtained that:
sit+1   sit = (  1)i;t + [i;t+1 + (  1)"i;t 1] = (  1)i;t + i;t (4)
One alternative for estimating the persistence parameter is by using unit root tests
(Clark and Stabler, 1991). Nevertheless, in this paper, we are following the proposal of
Davis and Weinstein (2002) so, in our present context, we are interested in the following
version of (4):
4Davis and Weinstein (2002) considered  = 1 as consistent with the pure random growth theory
(which gives a foundation for understanding Zipfs Law). On the contrary,  = 0 is interpreted as
evidence of the locational fundamentals theory.
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si;1865+k   si;1865 = (  1)i;1865 + i;1865 (5)
where i;1865 denotes the ACW shock, k is the time horizon considered and
i;1865 = i;1865+k + (  1)"i;1860 (6)
From equation (2), it can be expressed that:
"i;1860 = "i;1850 + i;1860 (7)
Combining (2) and (3), and referring to the ACW period, leads to:
si;1865   si;1860 = "i;1865 "i;1860 = i;1865 + (  1)"i;1860 (8)
Equation (8) reects that the shock caused by the ACW is incorporated in to the rel-
ative city size growth rate during the conict (si;1865 si;1860). Nevertheless, this growth
rate might also contain past information ("i;1860) and, given (7), will be correlated with
(6). Therefore, there is a measurement error problem that, as will be explained in the
next subsection, is further complicated by the fact that city population is observed
every 10 years. For this reason, the ACW relative city size shock (i;1865) can only be
proxied by the growth rate experienced during the 1860s. These circumstances make
it necessary to resort to the use of Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation methods
in order to identify the ACW shock and, hence, obtain an unbiased estimation of the
persistence parameter.
The city size data frequency leads us to estimate the persistence of the shock 15
years after the war ended. This is not problematic because the resulting time horizon
is similar to those analyzed by previous studies that considered it to be the preferred
adjustment period. The reason is that it seems to reect the time required for shocks
to dissipate (Brakman et al., 2004).
Summarizing, an unbiased estimation of the persistence parameter will be obtained
by the application of an IV estimator to
si;1880   si;1870 = + (si;1870   si;1860) + ui (9)
where  = (  1).
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The method used in this paper is that known as Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS).
The instruments that will allow us to identify the ACW shock must be correlated with
the shock but not with the error term in (9), which, following (6), is given by:
ui = i;1880 + (  1)"i;1860 +mi (10)
where mi is related to the measurement error due to the frequency with which the
data population is observed.
Finally, note that Equation (9) includes a constant term because we are working
with the share of city population relative to total U.S. population, and not of all the
cities in the sample. This parameter might reect long-run trends of the urbanization
process.
3.2 Data sources and variables
Blattman and Miguel (2009) pointed out that a major goal of civil war researchers
within both economics and political science in the coming years should be the collection
of more data. This is not an easy task for war periods and is even more complicated
for conicts that took place in the 19th century.
The total U.S. and city population data studied in this paper have been extracted
from the Bureau of the Census (Department of the Interior). As noted before, this
information is available on a 10-year basis. Our nal sample consists of data on 104
cities that had more than 25,000 inhabitants in 1890. 93 of them were in Union states
and the other 11 were Confederates5. This resulting sample size is determined by the
data availability of the instruments. Finding the latter has been the most di¢ cult stage
of this research.
Davis and Weinstein (2002) used deaths and buildings destroyed per capita as in-
struments for the WWII shock. Similarly, Brakman et al. (2004) considered the loss
of housing stock during this war and its casualties. In addition, they also included the
amount of rubble in cubic meters per capita as an instrument.
The only city that was destroyed during the ACW was Atlanta. As has already
been noted, this war was basically fought in the open eld. For this reason, a measure
5Our sample size and composition are similar to those in Brakman et al. (2004). These authors
analyzed 103 German cities during WWII, 81 of which were in West Germany and the other 22 in the
East.
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of the destruction su¤ered by a city would not be a good instrument to identify the
shock. In addition, the information of the soldiers furnished or dead is only available
at the State level and refers only to the members of the Union army.
The main instrument considered in our analysis in order to identify the ACW demo-
graphic shock is the share of widows as a percentage of city population. This information
has been obtained from the 11th Census and is classied according to the place of res-
idence of the dead soldier. The reason for this variable being introduced in relative
terms is to better gauge the shock intensity. Moreover, and in light of the scatter plot
in Figure 2, this instrument is expected to be negatively related to the shock.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
It can be considered that the shock caused by the ACW will also be related to
the number of men involved from a given city. In order to reect this e¤ect, it would
be interesting to use the number of men of military age (between 18 and 45) as an
additional instrument, but this information is only available for States. Nonetheless,
there is information available in the Census about the number of men in a given city. So,
as a robustness check, the proportion of men as a percentage of total population in 1860
has also been included as an instrument. Although there is no a priori expected sign for
the relationship of this variable with the shock, especially when it is introduced as an
instrument jointly with the percentage of widows, the scatter plot reported in Figure 3
suggests that it is positively correlated to the relative size growth rate experienced in
the 1860s. This implies that cities with a higher percentage of males at the beginning of
the war were less adversely a¤ected by its demographic shock. That is, the higher this
percentage, the higher the potential growth due to reproductive and labor force motives
and, hence, the ACW shock should be less severe. Nevertheless, this relationship should
be interpreted with caution because it might be inuenced by the presence of outlying
observations (Dehon et al., 2009).
[Insert Figure 3 here]
9
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive analysis
Before estimating the persistence of the ACW shock on relative city size, this subsection
describes the demographic trends in the U.S. and the cities that conform our sample
during the period 1850-1880.
Free and slave population, omitting the Indian tribes, increased by 8,251,445 people
from 1850 to 1860, a growth rate of 35.46 per cent, which is almost the same as in the
previous decade (35.87 %). None of the states experienced a decrease in its population
until 1860 and New York (25.29 %) and Pennsylvania (25.71%) had the highest growth
rates.
At the beginning of the war, the population structure was predominantly rural,
especially in the southern states. As an example, New York was the biggest city of its
state in 1860, and 99.01 per cent of the population of its county lived there. However,
they represented only 20.76 per cent of the whole state. Only 13.61 per cent of the
population of the U.S. lived in cities of more than 10,000 inhabitants included in the
sample.
Contrary to what would have happened if the U.S. population had followed the pre-
war trends, the gure of 40 million inhabitants was not reached by 1870. In fact, the
U.S. population growth rate in the 1860s was only 22.62 per cent, a fall with respect to
the previous decades. So, it is necessary to analyze the impact of the Civil War and,
thereby, account for the "loss" of nearly 2 million inhabitants, the di¤erence between
the population that would have been expected following th pre-war trends and the
gure that actually appeared in the 1870 Census.
The deceleration of population growth was not only due to lives lost in the war but
also to indirect losses like those derived from the large number of single men ghting
in the war who could not form families, the paralysis of the inmigration process and
changes in the daily habits of citizens. Nevertheless, the population grew by more than
7 million in this decade. Unlike what has been reported for Japan and Germany during
WWII, all except one6 city in our sample increased their population in absolute terms
during the 1860s. However, this increase tended to be lower than that of the 1850s.
For example, the population of New York increased by 290,111 inhabitants in the 1850s
6New Bedford (Massachusetts) had 22,300 inhabitants in 1860 and 21,320 in 1870.
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and by 136,634 in the 1860s. Therefore, it can be stated that the War of Secession led
to a slowdown in population growth.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Table 2 reports the growth rates of the U.S. and the average growth rate of the cities
in our sample for the three decades between 1850 and 1880. While, the total population
growth decreased in the 1860s with respect to the 1850s, it later recovered in the 1870s
but without reaching the initial level. Nonetheless, the cities that conform our sample
followed a di¤erent pattern to that of the country as a whole. On the one hand, it can
be observed in the second row that the average growth rate follows a decreasing trend.
On the other, the magnitude of the growth rate of the sample cities is higher than that
of the country. More interestingly, we have grouped the cities according to whether they
are located in a state where battles were fought (third row) or in a state without battles
(sixth row). Comparing the two cases, it is observed that, although the average growth
rates of both types of cities followed a decreasing trend, the reduction experienced by
those in battle zones is nearly negligible between the 1850s and the 1860s. Moreover, if
we di¤erentiate the cities in states where more than 15 battles took place (intense) and
those with fewer than that number (less intense), it is observed that the former, not
only did not reduce their growth rate, but experienced a much higher average growth
rate during the 1860s.
All these gures lead us to suspect that, given the open eld character of this war,
the big cities experienced a safe harbor e¤ect. As noted by Glaser and Shapiro (2002),
"[T]he rst, and probably most important, interaction between warfare and urban devel-
opment is that historically cities have provided protection against land-based attackers.
Cities have the dual advantages of large numbers and walls and thus, holding the size of
the attack constant, it is much better to be in a city than alone in the hinterland. This
suspicion will be supported in the next subsection devoted to presenting the estimation
results.
4.2 Estimation of the persistence parameter
Estimation results using Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) are reported in Table 3. The
upper panel shows those corresponding to the rst stage when the relative city size
growth rate during the 1860s is regressed on the instruments. In order to capture
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further unobserved specic factors, state dummies have also been introduced in to this
rst stage. Only three of them were systematically signicant in all the specications
included in Table 3. The rst corresponds to the state of Colorado for which only the
city of Denver is included in the sample. It has a negative sign and its signicance is a
result of its outlying nature. People went to Denver in 1858 when gold was discovered
in Cherry Creek. Denver and Auraria joined together to form a bigger city and became
the capital of Colorado seven years later. The city was almost destroyed by a re
in 1863 and a ood a¤ected a great number of buildings. Together with the Indian
wars, are this led to a deceleration of population growth during these years. In 1870,
the inhabitants numbered 4,759 and in 1880, 35,629, this growth was mainly related
to the arrival of the railway. Another signicant dummy is that for Nebraska, whose
sign is positive, which may be related to the fact that it is one of the states that lost
less population in absolute terms (239 soldiers). Finally, Missouri also has a positive
and signicative associated dummy. It is a frontier state and was the scene of a great
number of battles, which can be considered as a rst statistical evidence of the presence
of a safe-harbor e¤ect. The second column displays the results from the regression
that uses widows as a percentage of city population as the instrument to identify the
ACW shock. As expected, this variable is negatively related to the relative size growth.
[Insert Table 3 here]
The validity of the instruments is reected by the fact that they are able to explain
almost 30% of the variability of the growth rate during the 1860s. Using this rst
specication, the estimated value for the  parameter in (9) is 0.07, that is, very close
to zero and not signicantly di¤erent from it. The implied persistence parameter ()
for the shock is 1.07, with a condence interval of 95% (0.83,1.31). Therefore, it can be
stated that the persistence parameter is equal to 1 and, hence, the ACW shock had a
persistent e¤ect on relative city sizes.
The second column in Table 3 reports the results when the share of men as a
percentage of the total population in 1860 is included as an additional instrument. In
principle, the intention is to reect the potential soldiers of a given city. However, the
estimated sign of the relationship between the share of men and the growth rate in
the rst stage regression is positive. This implies that cities with a higher number of
men before the war experienced a smaller shock in their population. In this case, the
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explanatory power of the instruments is clearly higher than that of the specication
described above. Nonetheless, the estimated persistence of the shock does not change.
It can be concluded from the results presented above that the shock of the ACW
had a permanent e¤ect. This constrasts sharply with the ndings of previous analyses
of WWII in Germany and Japan. Except in the case of Atlanta, most of the battles
were fought in open country. As a result, urban infrastructures did not su¤er important
damage. This is an essential di¤erence with the studies of WWII, in which there were
many civilian losses and a systematic destruction of cities. Apart from the di¤erent era
in which the conict took place, this distinctive feature of the War of Secession may be
one explanation for the di¤erent nature of the shock caused on relative city size growth.
The descriptive analysis in subsection 4.1 gives the idea that the ACW shock was of not
so negative. On the contrary, the rural aspect of the war leads us to suspect that people
tended to take refuge in large cities. In order to corroborate this impression, a dummy
reecting that no battles took place in the state to which a given city belongs to has
also been included as an instrument. Results are shown in the fourth column of Table
3. The sign of the parameter related to this dummy is negative implying that cities
located in states with no battles experienced a lower growth rate. The explanatory
power of the instruments is even greater but, nonetheless, the rest of the conclusions
do not change.
Although the results have not been reported7 due to the small number of cities in
the sample that are located in Confederate states, we have repeated the same analysis
distinguishing between Southern and Northern states. The evidence obtained suggests
that the persistence of the shock in the Confederate cities was smaller than in those of
the Union. The persistence parameters for the former are around 0.5, while those for
the latter are almost the same as those reported in Table 3.
5 Concluding remarks
Previous studies have established that German and Japanese cities recovered their pre-
WWII relative size growth rates in a short time. That is to say, the strategic bombing
of the Allied air forces during that war only had temporary e¤ects. The only existing
evidence of a persistent nature of the shock is weak and corresponds to the cities in
East Germany.
7They are available from the authors upon request.
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This paper tries to contribute to the scarce literature about the persistence of the
demographic shocks caused by wars on urban structures by analyzing relative U.S.
city sizes during the period 1860-1880. The shock derived from the ACW is of an
important magnitude as more than 600,000 men of the 31 million inhabitants died in
the conict. This gure, in relative terms, is much greater than the U.S.lives lost in
WWII or in Vietnam. Moreover, and to the best of our knowledge, the ACW has never
been analyzed with the econometric rigour it deserves.
The main conclusion we can draw is that the temporary shock of the ACW had a
permanent e¤ect on relative city size distribution. Therefore, those cities that experi-
enced a higher (lower) growth during the war were those with a higher (lower) growth
rate in the 1870s. In addition, evidence has been reported regarding the fact that the
ACW did not induce a decrease in city size and that the U.S. total population growth
rate only decelerated in the 1860s with respect to the adjacent decades. So, apart from
the di¤erent historical stage, there are other di¤erences between the ACW and WWII.
While WWII caused many civilian casualties and signicant destruction of buildings in
Japanese and German cities, the rural nature of the ACW led to the appearance of a
safe harbour e¤ect. The latter mitigated the (direct and indirect) casualties derived
from the war and was more intense in the States where more battles were fought.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that our results should be taken with caution, mainly
because of the shortage of data that forces us to work with a sample of 104 cities.
Moreover, the frequency of the information in the Census has obligated us to proxy
the shock with data referring to the whole decade. Nevertheless, we believe that the
e¤ort made to carefully explain the empirical model, the availability of information
regarding the number of widows by city and the reasoning used throughout the paper
give creedence to the analysis.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Relevant data. American Civil War, 1861-1865.
Union Confederates
Dead in battle 110,070 94,000
Other dead 250,152 164,000
Total 360,222 258,000
Furnished 2,777,304 1,400,000
Population in 1860 22,339,989 9,103,332
Sources: www.census.gov and www.civilwarhome.com
Table 2: Population growth rate (%) comparison, 1850-1880.
1850s 1860s 1870s
Total U.S. 35.46 22.62 30.07
Sample cities 107.49 94.75 55.62
Battle 105.13 103.30 61.21
Intense 75.68 115.02 31.40
Less intense 115.93 99.28 71.44
No battle 109.39 87.70 51.00
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Table 3: Instrumental variables (2SLS) estimation results.
Specication (1) (2) (3)
First stage
Endogenous variable:
Relative city size
growth 1860-70
Constant 0.53*** -1.28*** -0.88*
Widows -0.54*** -0.46** -0.70***
Men 0.04*** 0.03***
No battle -0.20***
R2 0.28 0.38 0.42
Second stage
Endogenous variable:
Relative city size
growth 1870-80
Constant 0.10** 0.08* 0.07*
Relative city size
growth 1860-70
0.07 0.13 0.15
R2 0.08 0.12 0.13
Number of observations 104 104 104
Persistence parameter (b) 1.07 1.13 1.15
95% condence interval [0.83 , 1.31] [0.92 , 1.33] [0.96 , 1.34]
Note: ***, ** and * denote signicant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. First
stage estimations include state dummies for Colorado, Nebraska and Missouri.
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Figure 1: The Confederate and the Union states during the American Civil War. Source:
www.worldbook.com.
Figure 2: Scatter plot between relative city size growth rate during the 1860s and the
percentage of widows over the city population.
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Figure 3: Scatter plot between relative city size growth rate during the 1860s and the
percentage of men over the city population.
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